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ARISTOTLE'S CHILD; FORMATION THROUGH GENESIS. OIKOS. AND POLIS 
Daryl McGowan Tress 
Fordham University
Introduction
Aristotle has many different things to say about children and childhood in his writings. For example, 
begetting offspring is one of the basic efforts in which all animals, including human animals, are engaged. 
(History of Aniials (HA) 589a5; 596b21; Nichomachean Ethics (MI) 1162al8) Human children are born singly for 
the most part but, he notes, frequently twins are born; the most babies resulting from one birth is five which 
"has already been seen to happen in several cases." (HA 584b33-5) He observes that immediately after birth 
infants cry out and raise their hands to their mouths, but he adds that for forty days afterward they neither 
laugh nor cry while awake (although they might do both while asleep). (HA 587a28-b9) On his view, parents and 
children are philoi. friends, but unequal ones. Parents are superior, but it is they who are lovingly attached 
to their children as other selves. Children, on the other hand, love their parents only after some time, when 
they have acquired understanding (MI VIII Il61b26). He speaks, too, of the affection children typically have 
for siblings and friends (NE VIII.12 1162al0-15), but he writes that children are incapable of eudaimonia (NE 
1.9 1100a2) and of choice. (MI III.2 llllb7) He insists they be shielded from morally corrupting influences 
(Politics (£ol) VII. 15 1136bl-36), and believes they should be exposed to cold for its beneficial effects (Eel 
1335bl4). He discusses children's pastimes, and the appropriate ages for their training at home and their 
public schooling (Eel VII. 15 1-11), among many other themes.
What are we to make of these fascinating but disparate observations? In some, Aristotle generalizes 
about the generative origins of offspring, and in others he makes direct, empirical statements about children's 
behavior, even in unexpected settings.1 He gives detailed, scientific explanations of the child's origins, 
and historically documents unusual occurences of his time regarding children, such as the birth of quintuplets. 
He speculates about the relationship between parents and their children, comments on the feelings children have 
for one another and their likes and dislikes, and makes practical recommendations about their up-bringing and 
education.
1 Normally in Aristotle's time a man would not be present during the mother's labor and delivery. The 
pregnant woman would be attended by women of her household and a mid-wife. In complicated deliveries a doctor 
might have been called. The father would not be on hand. (Robert Garland. The Greek Way of Life. From 
Conception to Old Age. Ithaca: Cornell University Press> 1990, pp.61-66) Aristotle speaks in some detail, 
however, of the skill required of the nurse and mid-wife in delivery (SA 587a9-24); it might be supposed on 




Aristotle's corpus does not include a single, sustained logos on the hunan child.2 In fact, soie of 
the statements sampled here are occasional remarks or digressions from other, major themes. Therefore we might 
wonder, first, whether Aristotle has much philosophical interest in children and, second, whether he has a 
comprehensive notion of children's nature that integrates his various observations about and directions 
regarding children.
The first question can be given an initial answer by noting that he refers to a treatise of his on 
child-rearing, unfortunately not extant. (Pol I335b5) Many treatises refer to children in one way or another, 
and several contain discussions about or applicable to a study of the child. These later are notably
Generation of Animals (GA), Nichomachean Ethics (Mi) and Politics (Pol) (and shorter but illuminating
discussions are to be found in History of Animals and Eudemian Ethics).3 This listing of works, however, 
indicates a potentially serious methodological obstacle to the integration of Aristotle's views regarding the 
child. The list reveals the two main lofii of his observations and reflections regarding children to be the 
biological treatises and the ethical and political works. Biology on the one hand and ethics and politics on 
the other represent two distinct kinds of knowledge for him, namely theoretical and practical.4 Thus his
2 In this respect, the Hippocratic corpus stands in contrast to Aristotle's in containing a work titled, 
"On the Nature of the Child (pais)*" (Hippocratic Writings. G.E.R. Lloyd, editor. NY: Penguin Books, 1983 and 
Oeuvres Completes D'Hippocrate. VII, E. Littré, editor. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1962.) Note, however, that the 
Hippocratic work concerns fetal development rather than the child's postmatal life.
Just as there is no single treatise by Aristotle on the child, there is none on human nature or the 
human being as such. Don Asselin's Human Nature and Eudaimonia in Aristotle (NY: Peter Lang, 1989) discusses 
the absence in the corpus of such terms as anthropos kata phusis. eidos anthropou. and so forth. See 
"Introduction," especially pp. 4-5.
3 H. Bonitz, Index.,M atoteUcttS S.v. pals, tel»  and naps. T.W. Organ, An Index to Aristotle. In English 
Translation. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949) provides a less complete listing for "children."
In addition to the treatises mentioned which present developed discussions of matters pertaining to 
children, remarks about children are found, for example, in Physics 248al, and in spurious or contested works: 
On Colors 797b24-29 and 798a30, On Things Heard 801b5, 803bl9, and in Problemata 872a3-8, 895al4, 902a5-35, 
902bl6-19. Aristotle sometimes uses the example of a parent and child, as in Hgta 1013a32, 1018b22, and in 
Rhetoric 1401al and 1401a35-37, to illustrate a point he is making on some subject other than children per se.
4 The proper light in which to view the biological sciences is a matter of some controversy. In Hsiâ VI. 1 
Aritotle explains that the natural sciences, of which biology would be a part, are theoretical rather than 
productive or practical sciences. But in EA 640al-2 he says that demonstration and necessity differ in the 
natural and theoretical sciences, indicating some fundamental distinction between the two. (See too Phys II.2 
and 9; also D.M. Balme, "Aristotle: EA 1.2-3: Argument and Text," Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological 
Society 196: 12-21, 1970). Against Balme's proposal, Marjorie Grene favors a more traditional classification 
of the biological sciences as theoretical, but as having a secondary status within the theoretical ("About the 
Division of the Sciences," in Aristotle on the Nature of Living Things. Allan Gotthelf, editor. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Mathesis Publications, Inc., 1985, pp. 9-13) Balme's reading recommends itself as giving a greater emphasis 
to the empirical method in biology.
3observations about children fall within two of his three broad classes of knowledge (the three being the 
theoretical, practical and productive sciences).5 Whether or not Aristotle has a conprehensive account of the 
child, then, concerns the coordination of these doiains of knowledge and the kinds of characterizations proper 
to each of then. But questions arise about that coordination froa Aristotle's often-stated principle of the 
division and autonoiy of the sciences.6 According to this principle, the theoretical, practical and productive 
sciences are distinguished froa each other by their differing subject latter, aias, aethods of inquiry, and 
standards of precision. Aristotle lakes it plain that the sciences are irreducible and non-*transferable.7 
Not only are the sciences separate but they are ordered hierarchically. Thus, achieving a coaprehensive account 
of the child by leans of an interdisciplinary blending of the distinct inquiries within which he speaks of 
children is precluded by a fundaaental principle of his systea. With the prohibition against aixing the 
disciplines, the second of our initial question, i.e. dfiSS. Aristotle have a fully coaprehensive view of the 
child, should perhaps be changed to: Aristotle offer such a view? The answer would appear to be "no."
Although Aristotle does not fully and explicitly systeaatize his conception of children in a single 
treatise or a single science, we can reconstruct his view and show its coherent pattern. The aethod of this 
reconstruction is not, however, interdisciplinary. Rather, full respect for disciplinary boundaries and 
hierarchy is aaintained by recognizing that the biological, ethical and political works lake available a 
coaposite concept of the child. That is, for Aristotle, the huaan child aust be regarded as a substance that 
coaes to be, grows and develops to coapletion as a huaan adult. Within this progression there are distinct
5 The reaarks regarding children in the Rhetoric and Poetics, works of the productive science, are 
incidental and few. Aristotle does not seea to consider children "productively.”
6 See Topics 145al5, Mêtâ 1025bl-14, £hyg Π.2; also AöEö 76a23-30, 84bl4-18, 89b21-90a34; SA 748a7-12; 
HE VI.
7 Aristotle's separation of the sciences has received renewed attention - and defense - recently in 
response to Martha Nussbaua's interpretation of De Motu Aniaaliua (HA)· (Nussbaua, M.C. Aristotle's De Motu 
Aniaaliua: Text with Translation. Coaaentary and Interpretive Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978.). According to Nussbaua, in HA Aristotle revises what she takes to be his early, "separation” position, 
expressed in the Organon, in favor of an interdisciplinary approach, in this case one which would blend 
cosaology and biology (Nussbaua, p. 109, 113; see also Nussbaua, M.C. The Fragility of Goodness. NY: Caabridge 
University Press, 1986, Chap. 9 ). Her interpretation does not challenge the basic division of theoretical, 
practical and productive sciences, but a revision even of the departaental subdivisions within these would 
perhaps call for a reinterpretation of the strict division of the three aajor sciences. On her reading, 
Aristotle opens the way in HA for ways in which the sciences legitiaately can aix with one another and indeed 
depend on one another. Nussbaua's claia that Aristotle offers a new interdisciplinary directive has been 
challenged: by J. Rung, "Aristotle's De Motu Aniaaliua and the Separability of the Sciences." J. History of 
Philosophy 20:65-76, 1982; D. Balae, Review of M.C. Nussbaua, Aristotle's De Motu Aniaaliua. Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 20:91-95, 1982; and in passing by H. Lang, "Why Fire Goes Up: An Eleaentary Problea in 
Aristotle's Physics." Rev. Meta.38: 69-106, 1984. Nussbaua herself is well aware of the pervasiveness of the 
separation thesis in Aristotle's work, and she discusses it, Aristotle's De Motu Aninaliua. pp. 109-113.
4phases, each with its own telos and investigated by a distinct science. The unity of the child and its 
coiposite concept, then, relies on (a) a defining feature of the child common to these phases and their 
treatments in £A, HE, and £ol/ (h) an ordered linking of the phases and different treatments; and (c) an 
explanatory structure of actuality and potentiality brought to bear in thé biology, ethics and politics. The 
common defining feature is that the child is "unfinished" relative to a telos. In the biology, the child is 
viewed as unfinished in his or her growth as a human animal;8 in the ethics, unfinished in the training in 
virtue; in the politics, unfinished in the education for adult life as a responsible citizen.9 He will examine 
each of these in greater detail below. But not only do Aristotle's discussions rely on this common feature of 
being unfinished, the developmental phases he discusses build on one another and can be seen to overlay one on 
the other, or to stack, forming a series of linked teloi. Thus, the ethical formation undertaken in the oikos. 
the "family" or "household," is appropriate only for a child who has gone through and completed the process of 
early human growth and development described in the biology; political formation, in turn, is appropriate only 
for a child for whom ethical formation in the oikos has begun.10 Each is a grounding prerequisite for the 
next.11 Furthermore, Aristotle's explanation of the child's transformation and movement from unfinished to
0 Regarding Aristotle's assumptions about the sex of the child under discussion, Hark Golden writes. "Pais 
is a common Greek word for both child and young person, male and female." "Pais, child and Slave.” L'Antiquite 
classique 54:91-104. 1985.
9 The fetation as finished or complete near the end of pregnancy, §A 776a31-776b3, with the clear 
implication that earlier it is unfinished; the child as having all the parts of a human soul but in an 
incomplete or unfininished way, M  1260al2-14; the child as incomplete with respect to virtue, Pol I260a32? 
and the child as incomplete with respect to citizenship, M  1278a3-6.
10 The child, then, is always human. In "The Meaning of Sips in Aristotle's Ethics and Politics." (Ancient 
Philosophy 9:15, 1989), David Keyt offers the suggestion that different stages of human life correspond for 
Aristotle with the scala natura. Thus, "a foetus lives the life of a plant, a child lives the life of a lower 
animal."(p. 19) Such analogies can be derived, but it is clear, I believe, that they are meant only 
analogically and not ontologically. Aristotle does not offer a "recapitulation" theory of development, 
according to which organisms repeat and eventually arise from lower forms of life; he rejects the evolutionary 
model according to which ontogeny repeats phylogeny. Indeed, he rejects attempts to explain unity and 
complexity from the nature of the parts or lower stages alone. Keyt's aim in his discussion is to establish 
an ethical point about hiss as a way of life, i.e. to take up a question that arises in HE regarding the best 
way of life. He acknowledges the distinction between biss and jgg, but his expression tere perhaps 
inadvertently suggests, incorrectly, an ontological transformation in the child's nature over the developmental 
course. The risk of confusion in this case is a reminder of the signficance of Aristotle's division of the 
sciences.
11 There are particular models for comparison with my proposal here found in both theoretical and practical 
works. In the tripartite psyche of De Anima the broad-based and widely-shared nutritive soul has a distinct 
task that can also be seen to serve the higher psychic function of sensation, which in turn is linked to the 
higher reason. In the progress of social units Aristotle describes in the Politics the aims ascend from 
obtaining the bare necessities of life to virtue and freedom (i.e. the good life). (M. 1.2, and see Mary 
Nichols' insightful discussion in Citizens and Statesmen. A Study of Aristotle's Politics. Savage, HD: Rowman
5coiplete, both overall and within each of its phases, consistently applies the concepts of actuality and 
potentiality in such a way that the child's potential being - as a human aninal, as ethical and as political - 
resides in a prior actuality external to it, Thus, the linkage is very strong and close between cause and 
effect. In generation the male and female parents are the prior actualities who possess potentialities for the 
offspring to come to be. In ethical fonation in the oikos. again the parents are themselves actualities, 
ethically finished, in whose activités in relation to the child reside the potentialities to bring the child 
to acceptable ethical completion. In political formation, the polis and its lawgiver and schools are the 
actualities prior to the child that hold the potentialities for the child to become a cultivated participant 
in the public, political world.12 It is by means of this composition, that is, through phases studied by 
various sciences among which Aristotle establishes connections and employs common explanatory schemes, that 
his conception of the child emerges. & *11 *13At the same time, though, each science maintains its own integrity 
through its own telos and distinctive treatment of it. Indeed, because the phases represent different types 
of change (that is, substantial change in the biology, alteration in the ethics and politics), they require 
different types of explanation, a requirement that might be obscured by interdisciplinary mixing.
& Littlefield Publishers, 1992, Chap. 1.)
12 As Karl Reinhardt notes in his work on Sophocles, for the Greeks the three components of human existence
- and one's identity - answer the questions: "whence," "where," and "with whom," that is, they concern one's
origin, dwelling place, and friends. (Karl Reinhardt, Sophocles. NY: Harper & Row, 1979, p. 109) Aristotle's
biological, ethical and political discussions of the child can be viewed as conforming to the Greek notion of
identification through origin, dwelling place and friends, but with the important proviso that for him
specifying the telos in each case is crucial.
13 We might note, too, that this concept of the child as unfinished in relation to formative causes 
provides the basic justification for retaining the biological works, particularly SA, in a study of Aristotle's 
child. One option for solving the difficulty regarding the division of the sciences might seem to be to drop 
or at least segregate the bioloical treatises as not concerned with the child proper, but only with the fetation 
(kuemal. This option might recommend itself particularly if one assumes that the child comes into being or 
originates as a human child at birth. (S.C. Humphreys in her Introduction to The Family. Women and Death. 
Routledge, 1983, voices the warning about importing common assumption from our own time into the study of the 
ancient world.) That the child comes to be at birth was not, however, Aristotle's view, as will be shown. The 
vocabulary of SA and the other biological treatises sometimes includes pail and teknos, standard Greek words 
for "child;” this is one kind of evidence that for him the child has his or her beginnings prior to birth and 
so shows the need to retain the biological works in a study of Aristotle's conception of the child. Note that 
Hippocrates, too, uses jáis, "child," to refer to the entity prior to birth, as in the title of his work on 
generation, "On the Nature of the Child," (sp. sit.). Thus, that the child has his or her beginnings prior to 
birth was not a view unique to Aristotle. In addition, various of Aristotle's comments about the child's 
coming-to-be show that in his view the child "begins" prior to birth, within the female, (e.g. HA 5$la7-9) And 
in SA Aristotle most commonly uses the term kuema. "embryo" or "fetus" or, as Peck renders it, "fetation" to 
refer to the entity that is informed but unfinished in various ways, which is consistent with the conceptual 
consistency to be established here, namely, that of the child's unfinished, relational nature across the 
biology, ethics and politics, to be grasped in terms of Aristotle's diversified yet linked teleological scheme 
and the model of form and matter, act and potential.
6We begin, then, to examine Aristotle's child, first in the in biology (GA and 2A), then in the ethics 
(M); and then the politics (M) and to ask how he gives a coiprehensive account which preserves the child's 
unity while keeping the sciences separate.14
It Biology - Foriation Through Genesis
We turn first to the inquiry into the child and its coiing to be in Generation of Aniials (£A). Huían 
beings are anong the creatures whose origins and developient he studies in G&. Genesis in the title of the work 
(and occuring frequently in the text) is a change froi the non-existence to the existence of an individual 
living substance (as coipared to techne which produces an inaninate object. See Physics II.1) Of fundaiental 
interest to hii is how the aniial coies to be as what it is, That is, there is an evident order and stability 
in the identity of the new entity that coses to be. Genesis is the regular and non-arbitrary arising of soie 
new substance. Rendering genesis as "foriation" highlights this regularity; rendering genesis as "coiing-to-be" 
esphasizes the newness or uniqueness of the entity.15 In §&, Aristotle investigates the causes of this ordered 
foriation of new living things.
The reasons that explain the coiing to be of aniial young and the huían child are to be sought through 
the four causes he specifies at the start of the treatise: (1) "that for the sake of which the thing exists, 
considered as its End," i.e. the final cause; (2) the logos of the thing's essence," i.e. the fonal cause; (3) 
"the natter of the thing," i.e. the íaterial cause; and (4) "that froi which coies the principle of the thing's 
loveient," i.e. the loving cause. (G£ 715a3-8)16 In generation, these factors iust all be present and 
available, and they iust interact in order for a new substance to arise. The sources of these causal factors 
(in lany cases theiselves providing the leans and the site of their coibination) are the archai of generation, 
the tale and feiale. (SA 7l6a5, al4, 716bll, 724bl5, 731bl8; on the interaction of the causal factors in îale
14 The order in which the treatises are to be exaiined reflects the course of the child's developient and 
is not leant to inply that the biology functions as a îodel for Aristotle's other discussions, nor that it takes 
chronological precedence.
15 See Peck's note on translation of genesis, p. lxi (Aristotle. Generation of Aniials. Peck, Introduction 
and translation. Boston: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1979).
16 D.H. Balie, M s M l e ,  De Partibus Aniialim I and De Generation Aniialiui I. Translation and Jiotes 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 127, believes this section (715a 1-18) nay be a post-Aristotelian addition. 
His concern, however, is with its lischaracterization of Parts of Aniials (£A). Balie is fin, though, about 
the basic role of the four causes in the explanatory scheie, not only of SA but in "every explanation of 
biological phenoienon." Beyond the concern about the reference to £A, however, the causal scheie is fundaiental 
for SA/ vaking it lore plausible that the passage at the opening is original rather than a later addendui to 
the treatise.
7and female 731alO-23)17 18
For Aristotle, the himan child has its origins in the parents. They are the actualities who, as 
sexually complete, have available in themselves the potentials for the generation of the offspring. Aristotle's 
explanation of generation bears soae resemblance preformationisn, a view widely held in his tine, according to 
which the adult parent bears the offspring within itself as a tiny, pre-formed hoionculus. But Aristotle 
rejects preformation as both empirically and theoretically inadequate. Instead, his generative theory (a) 
includes both aale and feaale parents, unlike preformationisn where one parent, often the aale, carries the
hoaonculus, and (b) his explanation has the parents carry - or, aore precisely, be - the potential for the
• · « · 18 child's generation, unlike preforiation which has no explanation for the child's coming-to-be.
Through a detailed study of the generative parts of the bodies of aany different aniaal species (SA 1.2- 
16), Aristotle begins his demonstration that both aale and feaale contribute causally to the generation of 
offspring and that their contributions differ. The aale parent concocts seed froa his heated blood; his seed 
conveys movement or the moving cause. The movement is transmitted to the female parent's contribution, namely, 
the matter for generation, also a product of heated blood. Thus, two necessary causal factors for a new living 
substance, motion and matter, are accounted for by the archai, male and feaale.19
17 Sexual generation sets the standard, as Balme points out; asexual or spontaneous generation is a 
departure from the norm. (SA 1.1 and Balme Commentary, De Partibus Aninalium I and De Generatione Aniaalium I. 
op. cit., p. 128)
18 Stephen Menn. "The Origins of Aristotle's - Concept of EûSiSSii·* and flunaais ."
Ancient Philosophy 14: 73, 1994, especially Section B.2 on potentialities located in the prior actualities.
19 SA IV.1. Also Balee, De Partibus Animaliua I and De Generatione Aniaalium I. gp. £&., Notes, p. 140.
Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990. Chap. 2) misrepresents Aristotle's account of generation, both in detail and in general, referring 
to it as a "one-sex" and as a "one-seed" theory. But ΙΑ X, for example, emphasizes that the female parent is 
a genuine contributor to generation:
"How up to thrice seven years the seeds are at first infertile, then they are 
fertile but the offspring of young men and young women are snail and 
imperfect, as in most other animals, too." (IA 582al7-20)
Balae's gloss (HA, p. 423) notes the clear implication that the feaale, too, produces seed (sperma). This means 
that for Aristotle, both male and feaale are generative and both are true parents. Balme comments on theories 
of male and feaale contributions to generation (HA Bks VII-X. pp. 487-9, and pp. 26-30 on the compatibility of 
GA and HA)· He holds that throughout HA X, "Aristotle argues that the feaale contributes seed to 
generation...,” in opposition to the idea that only the male does so that only he would be the true parent. (See 
too SA 489a9-12) Also relevant is Balae's discussion in "Anthropos anthropon oenna. Hunan is Generated by 
Human," (The Human Embryo. Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions. Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 1990, pp. 20-31). Preus, too, accepts the female's authentic spermatic contribution to generation 
(Anthony Preus, "Science and Philosophy in Aristotle's Generation of Animals." Journal of the History of Biology 
3, 1970, p. 6). But Balme observes, "It is odd, on the other hand, that in SA Arist. does not refute the 
opposing view (that the male alone contributes to generation); he mentions it without further argument at I 
72la35, IV 763b30." I submit that SA as a whole, with its initial thesis that the male and the female are the
8By establishing different aale and female contributions, each of which is the child potentially, 
Aristotle Bakes three important points about the child against rival theories: (a) Coipared with single-parent 
theories of generation, he links the child with both parents, since both are always necessary causal 
contributors to the offspring's cosing to be.20 Both bear necessary potentialities which interact to generate 
a new substance, (b) Compared to preformationist theories, he minimizes the role of external, chance factors 
in the child's formation. For example, in Empedocles' scheme where each parent offers preformed seed, the luck 
of the hotness or coldness of the uterine environment determines the offspring's destiny. (764al-7 f.) Again, 
according to Anaxagoras, the decisive occurrence has to do with the chance location of the deposited sperma on 
either the right or left side of the uterus.(763b30-35; 765a4-34) Aristotle will have none of this.(e.g. 
764WL0-15) Instead, for him the child's generation has a regular causal structure in the two parents and as 
such is intelligible.21 (c) Compared to materialist theories such as those of Democritus and Hippocrates, both 
of whom make the parts of the offspring's body "prior to" and causal of the whole body, for Aristotle the parts 
themselves must have a prior, ordering causes.22 These causes are the generative material always provided 
by the female parent, combined with the generative motions always contributed by the male parent. As he 
indicates at the start of the treatise, however, there are not just two but four causes which must be taken into 
account. Two of these, the formal and final, really distinguish Aristotle's view from those of the 
physiologists and medical writers, since for him the formal and final causes work to direct and organize the
archai of generation, functions as a refutation of the one-seed view.
20 He notes instances where male and female do not together play a role in generation, e.g. spontaneous 
generation (SA 715b7-l6) and wind-eggs (SA 737a25-34), but these are exceptions to nature's rule.
21 Democritus' theory, perhaps more sophisticated than theirs in that it allows better than theirs do for 
something like a regular principle of causality (i.e. strength ), holds that the determination of which seed 
prevails occurs in the uterus according to which is stronger, that of the female or male parent. Aristotle will 
employ a modification of this view in his own explanation of infertility and inheritance. See too 767a36 f. 
on "mastery" in inheritance; see, too, 767al4 f. on the need for symmetria between the two parents. That is, 
the couple must be in the right "balance" in order to effect generation. The juxtaposition of the two concepts 
in the passage is telling and emphasizes the necessary role of the £wg in generation.
22 See SA 722b6-724al4 against Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus. Compare Aristotle's emphasis on the 
unity of the organism and thus the need for formal explanation with Hippocrates' emphasis on parts in, for 
example, "The Seed" and "The nature of the Child,” and the Hippocratic mode of explanation which avoids formal 
and final causes. Beate Gundert, "Parts and their Roles in Hippocratic Medicine." Isis 83:453-465, 1992, 
writes on Hippocratic explanation:
"When occasionally the relationship between part and process is characterized in terms of 
cause, it is always one of conseguence - for example, 'We speak from the lung, because it is 
hollow and the windpipe is attached to it.... ' FHorb.4 56 (7.606.1-2) ]....- never of finality 
or purpose. Parts may perform particular roles because they have given structures; there is 
never any hint that they have particular structures in order to fulfill given roles." (p. 465)
9body's parts. (ÇA 778b2-12) Generation, the coming-to-be of a highly organized substance, is intelligible only 
on condition that there be fonal direction for the new, unified nature. In his account, the moving cause of 
generation is also the fonal and final cause. This, then, is how genesis is ordered fonation. The necessary 
and sufficient determinations for the offspring are routinely a shared contribution of the parents, relying 
fundaientally on thei and not on vagaries of external factors or accidental conditions,23 Aristotle further 
stabilizes the fonative process when, in SA 11.1/ he situates the parents themselves in an expanded causal 
scheme, stating that individual instances of generation are part of the perpetuation of the species, the kind 
of eternal life open to animal life.24 This is why generation occurs, to actualize eternity, a good, to the 
extent that it is possible.
The linkage between parent and offspring is explored at length in Book IV. Here Aristotle begins by 
asking how male and female come to be; this question leads to the broader question of inheritance of other 
characteristics and family resemblance generally. He puts the natter strongly: "...anyone who does not take 
after his parents is really in a way a monstrosity since in these cases Nature has in a way strayed from the 
generic type." (£A IV.3 767b7) He posits a scale ranging from very close resemblance (i.e. a boy who looks very 
much like his father), to small and necessary deviations from what appears initially to be an ideal of 
replication (e.g. a girl who looks like her father rather than her mother, a boy like his mother or grandparent 
or other relative), to deformed children and finally monstrous births marked by full departure from the human 
type. (SA 767b8 f.) Aristotle hastens to explain that at least the initial deviation from boy to girl is 
required by nature in order to accomplish its final aim of perpetuating the species; thus, depite the possible 
appearance of the superiority of replication, or of a single, superior sex, it is not the case, in his view, 
that nature operates this way or should do so. Deformities and monstrosities, however, are not fulfillments 
of any final cause, but are chance occurrences, that is, unfortunate departures from or failures of finality. 
The final aim for human children in the context of SA is to be human ( "anthropos anthropon aennai" 735a21), to 
be healthy and to closely resemble but not replicate their parents.25
We note, too, that the characteristics relevant to a discussion of inheritance are those that belong
23 Often in SA Aristotle takes note, of the impact of unfortunate factors (e.g. as in deformities SA 767b8), 
but these are understood to be departures from the norm of regularity.
24 The child, then, can be regarded as part of this larger causal nexus.
25 "Now both the individual and the oenos to which it belongs are at work in the act of generation; but 
of the two the individual takes the leading part...." (767b30 and 33 f.) Inheritance and whether and how it 
occurs at and possibly "below the species level" is a matter of considerable debate in contemporary scholarship. 
The literature is too extensive to cite fully, but for representative views on both sides see D.M. Balme, 
"Aristotle's Biology was not Essentialist," in Allan Gotthelf and Janes C. Lennox, Philosophical Issues in 
Aristotle's Biology (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Alan Code, "Essentialisn and the Life Sciences in 
Aristotle."(unpublished paper) The signficance of the question lies in understanding Aristotle's conception 
of "form," and whether for him form is individual.
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to the parent not accidentally but qua procreator; the examples he supplies of parents' irrelevant 
characteristics are being a araimatikos. a "teacher" or "scholar/ or being someone's next-door neighbor. 
(767b27-30) We light have wished for further clarification of the distinction between what is and is not 
relevant for biological inheritance with soie positive examples. But the discussion of inheritance in £A - and 
the treatise as a whole, for that matter - is notable for what it does not contain. AristoÙe does not say that 
individual temperaments, characters or intellectual talents áre determined by inheritance.26 He makes no 
mention of inherited blood guilt, curses, and the like, and he says nothing of inheriting the qualities of one's 
class.27 Nor does he speak of authochthony, a long-standing and popular Greek myth of origins from the 
earth.28 The biology is concerned with the formation of the animal gag animal, its body and the parts of the 
body, not the formation of individual character or social relations. The body and its parts aim at completion, 
at the full formation of the organsin.29 That Aristotle does not include popular, cultural notions in his 
biological treatise indicates his intention to keep separate the different domains of knowledge in his 
investigations.
The parents, as we saw, are the originary formative causes of the child's coming-to-be. But it is 
important to note, too, that beyond the parents' originary force, the offspring will develop in accord with its 
own inherent principles of growth: "...for of course nothing generates (cenna) itself, though as soon as it has
26 See Problemata on natural (congenital) temperament (XXX.1, e.g.). Character must of course be formed 
through upbringing (M)· Whether some individuals are more disposed to good character through inherited traits 
Aristotle does not say here, although at fil 1179b7-10 he refers to "an inbora nobility of character," and 
shortly after makes the surprising statement: "natural endowment is not under our control; it is bestowed on 
those who are fortunate, in the true sense, by some divine dispensation." (fig 1179b23) intellectual skill is 
the result of training, or schooling, (e.g. M  1337b22 f.) His remark about the aramaatikos at 767b27-30 
suggests that an inclination or ability for such work is not to be explained by means of a dunanis inherited 
from the parents.
27 Nothing is said of the matter of class in the biology, but Aristotle does comment (Pol 1255a26-27; also 
1255a39-b6) that the children of slaves are not themselves necessarily slaves by nature.
28 See Plato's use of this myth in £ep. Ill, 414c f. Also see Arlene Saxonhouse's discussion of the 
important role of authochthony in Greek culture in Fear of Diversity. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), Chap. 5.
29 On Book IV's theme of regularity in generation: the norm is to generate offspring like oneself; doing 
so requires male and female; inheritance: how regularity - and deviations from it - are produced from male 
and female; then, underdevelopment, redundancy of parts (overdevelopment), monstrosities, mise, irregularities; 
normal number of births, superfoetation, the finished or unfinished state of the young at birth; normal manner 
of birth (i.e. head first - the head is heaviest body part) and normal length of gestation.
In all these matters, Aristotle establishes the norm and examines its workings and the deviations from 
it. "Nature's aim," he says, "is to measure the generations and endings of things by the measures these bodies 
[i.e. heavenly bodies which move in regular periods], but she cannot bring this about exactly on account of the 
indétermination of natter and the existence of a plurality of principles which impede the natural processes of 
generation and dissolution and so are often the causes of things occuring contrary to Nature."(776a5-10)
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been generated (genital) a thing makes itself grow."(735al3)30 Be adds, "since it makes itself grow, it is 
something."(735a23) The offspring that results from the combination of the male and female generative 
contributions, from their combined potentialities, is an independent substance in Aristotle's view, with the 
means to direct its own growth. The heart is the first organ formed and it directs the nutritive requirements 
of the new individual.
We see, then, that the newly generated child originates in the combination of female generative matter 
and male generative movements, each of which is a particular potentiality for the kind of animal the parents 
are; these, together with the form and the telos. also from the parents, actualize and generate offspring of 
the parents' kind. The child's resemblance to one or both parents expresses that originary relation. Again, 
both parents contribute to the coming-to-be of the child, although one may be more influential than the other 
(compared to other theories in which one or the other parent exclusively holds sway). For Aristotle, the 
parents' necessarily joint contribution minimizes arbitrariness or randomness in generation.31 Generation is 
orderly because of the standard manner in which parents bring it about through their contributions. And the 
joint parental contribution accords well with the ordinary awareness that children do not simply replicate a 
parent but that the outcome of generation is a new substance. As long as both parents are necessarily 
contributors to every instance of a child's coming-to-be, it is impossible that only one should determine fully 
the child's potentialities; both always leave a mark. In this way, genesis is the coming-to-be of a new 
substance, a unique living entity. The human child is necessarily something new, is something itself with its 
own new set of potentialities, namely it is a substance with all that entails. Thus, Aristotle accounts for 
order and for newness in generation.
The biological tretise GA does the important job of explaining the "whence" of the child; the child's 
origins are definitively in the parents and their contributions to generation, according to Aristotle. The 
nature of the contributions, representing potentialities for individual and specific traits of both the male 
and female parents, and the joining together of these, also explains how the child can be a unique, new nature. 
Thus, he accounts for the early development of the child, up to its birth and shortly thereafter: the material 
and formal direction and sustenance of the parental contributions.32 Infancy marks a "soft boundary" of the
30 Also, "...once a thing has been formed, it must of necessity grow. And though it was generated by 
another thing bearing the same name (e.g. a man is generated by a man), it grows by means of itself."(735al9-22)
31 This in contrast to modem scientific reasoning according to the evolutionary model where the increased 
genetic variation available in sexual reproduction is viewed as an evolutionary asset.
32 HA bas not been examined in this paper, but there, when Aristotle writes at the start of IX.1:
"With regard to man's development, both initially within the female and subsequently until old 
age, the attributes due to his proper nature are as follows." (HA 581a9-ll, Balme translation,
12
early stages of the developiaental process. Understanding development in the young child must move from what 
children have in common with animals, as studied in the biology, towards what is uniquely human, namely, ethical 
formation. We turn next to the child's formation in virtue explained in fig.
II. Ethics - Formation in the Oikos
The Nichomachean Ethics is an examination of the moral life understood in its relation to the natural 
human goal, happiness (eudaimoniah In fig 1.7 Aristotle says that happiness is the activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue (fig 1098al7), so that happiness, for the most part, is the outcome of responsible human 
activity rather than fortune or fate. (e.g. Ill2b32)33 In keeping with this insight, he emphasizes that the 
point of ethics is practical action, not theory (fig 1103b26-28; 1179bl-5), i.e. we wish to know what it is to 
become good and how to do so since it is largely in our power and in this lies our happiness, fig demonstrates 
the nature of virtues (Bks. III-V), justice (Bk. V), and friendship (Bks. VIII-IX) and the necessity of 
incorporating these in a human life in order for it to be a happy one. Doing so and hence becoming good is a 
lengthy process of training from childhood which starts in the household.34 So while it is true that children 
do not comprise the stated focus of fig, seen in terms of the broadly defined purpose of ethics its concern is 
indeed children and their formation in virtue. Here, too, the parents are the direct causal contributors to 
accomplishing the ethical aim. Their on-going activities of nurture and discipline are the moving cause which 
will act on the child (as material cause) to bring about something new and ordered, i.e. virtue, out of mere 
wildness (akolasia).35
Ethical formation of the child in the oikos consists of right "nurture and discipline" (fig 1180a2)
Loeb edition)
such an introduction seems to promise a description of the child's development, and indeed human development 
broadly. In fact, fig IX(VII) views development from the perspective of generation: conception, pregnancy, and 
labour and delivery, along with some related matters concerning, for example, semen and milk production. Within 
this topic, Aristotle considers puberty (581b20, 23) in that the evident changes at this age signify readiness 
to generate.
33 Aristotle's implicit rejection of chance as primarily determinative of happiness or its absence is 
consistent with his position in the biology contra Empedocles et al. who hold that the offspring's attributes 
(such as its sex) are a matter of chance.
34 On the meaning of genos and oikos. "family" and "household,” blood kin and the larger economic unit 
including slaves and guests, closely blended notions, see for example, "Oikos and polis." and "The Family in 
Classical Athens: Search for a Perspective." In S.C. Humphreys. The Family. Women and Death. Boston: Routledge, 
1983.
35 See, too, Aristotle's remarks in M  I: the child has the deliberative part of the soul but in an 
unfinished form (1260al5), and "the child is not completely developed, so that manifestly his virtue also is 
not personal to himself but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the person in authority over him." 
(1260b31-32)
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undertaken by the child's parents. Nurture consists of providing affection, shelter and sustenance for the 
child. Discipline consists, on the one hand, in continually discouraging the child's "wildness/ (akolasia) 
i.e. the free action of the passions and desires, and on the other, continually encouraging positive acts of 
virtue which by habituation will fon a virtuous character. The chief attribute of growing children, according 
to the discussions in HE, is that they are "guided by feeling" rather than reason and experience, (e.g. HE 
1095a8, 11; 1119a35; 1142al2 f.) In order for the child to grow to saturity, the guidance of reason - 
cultivated through the repeated exercise of restraint on the one hand and virtuous conduct on the other - Bust 
supercede acting out of iipulse. The sources of this guidance are the parents.
As adults, the parents are able to assuie the work of the child's ethical guidance and foraation because 
their own deliberative faculties are nature and because they have had sufficient experience of life. In 
children, on the other hand, the noetic faculty responsible for deliberation is not developed (HE 1119b9-ll); 
thus unable to deliberate, children are incapable of choice which is the lark of true ethical activity. So, 
too, children cannot be said to be happy (HE 1100a2); happiness requires the perfontance of noble deeds which 
as such lust be deliberately chosen. Note, however, that Aristotle's stateient is not a condemnation of 
children but rather an observation about their incoiplete state of developient: "when children are spoken of 
as happy, it is in coipliient to their proiise for the future.” (HE 1100a3) Sinilarly, in the case of the 
"wildness" which is so characteristic of children, he writes of children's need for discipline and he assîmes 
their capacity for obedience (HE 1119b 4-16), both of which bespeak a potential for order within the child. 
When discussing the need for controlling the child's akolasia, he seess to suggest that the parents' authority 
and coipetence stei fro* their own proper, actualized self-control, that is, that principle prevails over 
unprincipled desire in the parents qua adults (although he sentions that there are adults who are wild and 
inteiperate theiselves).
Aristotle thus sees the parents as prior actualities, ethically coiplete (i.e. "adequate" rather than 
"perfect") due to their own earlier ethical training and their experience of life. Their ethical actualization 
is in this case the capacity for activities of nurturance and discipline of the child. The nurturance and 
discipline are the loving causes of the child's own evenutal actualization as ethically coiplete. The repeated 
activities of the parents are the sources of the ethical telos for the child, i.e. virtue. The achievsent of 
the telos by the child will be larked both by independence froi the parent's ethical guidance, since the child 
can now deliberate for hii or herself, and at the sale tiie reseiblance to the parents in that the virtuous 
disposition will be siiilar in parents and their children. The pattern of coipletion here in the ethics is such 
the saie as in the biology: there, the child coses-to-be as a generatively coiplete huían aniial at birth, and 
at birth the child is both independent froi the generative sources as well as the saie in kind as thés. ëï 
parents, in lost cases, are capable of the task of the ethical fonation of their children, i.e. their nurture 
and discipline. But what proipts thei to take up this work? An explanation is available in the Politics where 
Aristotle upholds the faiily and the household against Socrates' proposal for their eliiination. A prelisinary
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answer is available here in fifi, however, in his designation of the relationship between children and parents
as a philia, "friendship," of unequals. In Book VIII, Aristotle extolls and analyzes friendship, of which the
parent-child relation is one kind. The affection of offspring for parents and parents for offspring is natural,
he says at the start, not only among human beings but among other animals too. (fig I155al7) But among human
beings affection seems to be secondary to the obligations of the relation:
"...the friendship between parents and children will be enduring and equitable, when the 
children render to the parents the services due to the authors of one's being, and the parents 
to the children those due to one's offspring." (fig 1158b21-23)
At stake here is the tension between justice and friendship which Aristotle addresses in Book VIII,36 The 
solution appears to be that friendly affection is natural in the relation between children and parents but the 
feeling does not define the relationship. Rather, affection is present in a successfully maintained 
relationship - the natural state of affairs, in his view - and indicates a proper ethical balance in the 
underlying bond itself.37 That is, the parents bring children into being and subsequently nurture and 
discipline them, i.e. they are the formative causes in generation and then assume the secondary, ethically 
formative role that follows from the first. The children born are the generatively complete result of the 
parents' potentialities (and this is why his statement that parents love their children as other selves is more 
than metaphor). At birth or sometime during infancy, the process of their generation is complete, that is, 
children are organically self-directed and separate from their parents. But the parents' own ethical adequacy 
allows them to recognize that am parents they possess further potentialités to be actualized for their children. 
These, again, are actualized as nurture and discipline which convey the ethical telos to the child. Finally, 
then, the children's affection for their parents is the outcome and evidence of their parents' successful 
efforts at ethical formation since affectionna disposition, is possible only when akolasia has been 
mastered. (M1161b26)
In the discussion so far we have spoken of the ethically formative work of the "parents.” Referring 
to the mother and father in this undifferentiated way is acceptable and Aristotle does so himself (e.g. hoi 
aoneis 1161bl8,19,20) when the relevant distinction is between the grown adults and their offspring, as it most 
frequently is. But he also recognizes distinctions between the father and mother vis a vis the child, such as 
the "father's exhortations" as head of the household and its chief authority (fig 1180b5), and the comments on 
"the pleasure mothers take in loving their children" (fig 1159a28-33), the paradigm of friendship as marked more 
by the giving than the receiving of affection. The observations about differences between mothers and fathers
36 See Joseph Cropsey. "Justice and Friendship in the Michomachean Ethics." Political Philosophy and the 
Issues of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
37 But note M  1255bl-3: "...they [erroneously] assume that just as man springs from man and from brutes 
a brute, so also from good parents come good offspring; but as a matter of fact nature frequently while 
intending to do this is unable to bring it about."
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áre, however, scanty and like other natters in ethics they are not hard and fast. (For exaxple, see MI 1160b23
f. for soie variations, such as when the wife rules in the oikos.) Mithin Book VIII, rejecting atteipts at
universal definitions of friendship, he offers a reiinder about the proper procedures and concerns of ethics:
"Dismissing then these scientific spéculations as not genane to our present inguiry, let us 
investigate the huían aspect of the latter, and exaiine the guestions that relate to lan's 
character and emotions...." (ME 1155b8-10)
The huían aspect of character and eiotions that is fundaiental to ethics introduces greater possible variety 
in comparison with regularities observable elsewhere in nature. Unlike the biology where the separate 
generative contributions of the íale and feiale parents are regular and stable and lust be so in order to 
account for regularities in the coiing-to-be of new substances, the ethics allows for lore latitude in the kind 
of fonative work perfoned by each of the parents. Ethics can do so because it does not need to account for 
substantial change, as the biology does. Thus it is not necessary to have feiale and íale parents lake separate 
and different causal contributions. Rather, the ethics looks to account for alteration from akolasia to a well· 
ordered character. In this process the parents together function as loving causes with room, apparently, to 
share the work of nurture and discipline. So although Aristotle holds that the virtue of íen and women differs 
(Pol 1260a f.), he lakes little of it in discussing children and their upbringing.
One further contrast between the ethics' treatient of the child and that of the biology can be offered. 
In Mir he speaks of the child's siblings and companions as friends, and lentions the child's tutor and the 
slaves within the oikos as well.38 In other words, at this stage of the child's developient a widening circle 
of influences is found. Recall that in SA Aristotle distinguishes his theory from others by liniiizing the 
place of randoi or haphazard factors in generation and liiiting fonative influence to the two parents. In the 
ethics, he recognizes the presence of other influences on the child. It is clear, however, that in his view 
none of these relations should rival the significance of the fonative work of the parents, and indeed warns 
against undue external influences, (e.g. Eßl 1336a39-41; b4-14)
lilt M i t o  - Foliation tiragft the Pelis
The parents have brought the child into being and have begun the work of teipering the child's wildness 
through nurture and discipline. In defending the faiily against Socrates' proposal of a radically conon life 
as an ideal ( M  11*1-2), Aristotle lakes it clear that the fonative work on the child undertaken in the oikos 
is non-transferable to the polis. Personal affection and caring are the larks of life in the oikos and these 
are indispensible for the child's early ethical training. In Μ  VII (again as in Μ  Π, the context is the 
consideration of the best government) the topic of education arises. Here, however, he discusses education
38 Mark Golden, "Pais. Child and Slave,” op. £&. on children and slaves. Also see bis fine study Children 
and Childhood in Classical Athens. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) for an extended 
exaiination of chldren's lany relations both within and outside of the oikos.
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in connection with the unity of the polis, so that the fonative role of the nolis in the child's developient
eierges through the effects of the lawgiver's regulations and through polis schools.
One of our initial observations concerned the division of the sciences and the iiportance of keeping
distinct the phases and hence the tasks of the child's generation and growth, with the aia of showing why these
need to be studied by different sciences, i.e. biology ((&), ethics (HI) and politics (M)» The M  now
provides confirvation of this thesis in its dicussion of a new causative agent, naiely the polis, and a new
venue of fonation, naiely the school and the polis broadly. But the initial question was whether or not, given
the division of these sciences, it is possible to achieve a coiprehensive and unified notion of the child, or
whether the different phases studied by the separate sciences reiain disconnected. An answer to this question
coies lore clearly into view in the Efil*
The best governed state will provide the lost opportunity for its citizens' well-being and happiness
(1332a5-8), and HI has established that huían happiness is a life of fully actualized virtue. This, then, is
the political telos. While soie external goods are needed for such a life and
"...that fortune does control external goods we acknowledge, but when we coie to the state's 
being virtuous, to secure this is not the function of fortune but of knowledge tepistêiisï and 
choice (proaireseos)." (1332a31-33)
As in the other developiental phases exaiined, Aristotle here underscores the intelligibility of the process
and shows cháncelo be a liniial factor. The question to ask is: how does a citizen - or a person - becoie
virtous? He says that there are three relevant factors, naiely nature, habit, and reason, and it becoies clear
that the three latch the phases of the child's fonation we are proposing. "To start with, one lust be born
with the nature of a huían being..."(1332a41); sexual generation does this work of nature. Then, he says,
habits are iiposed, for better or worse, on the qualities the huían child is born with; early ethical training
in the oikos does the work of changing given qualities into (virtuous) habits. "But huían beings live by reson
also..."(1332b5); reason is the distinguishing lark of the huían. He adds that these three - nature, habit and
reason - lust be in hanony in huían beings. Reason lust be trained, and Aristotle now pursues the question
of what that training should be.
"No one will doubt that the lawgiver should direct attention above all to the education of the children;
for the neglect of education does ham to the constitution. "( 1337al0-ll) Education should be directed to the
needs connected with one's role in adult life, especially the needs of statesien and citizens. But in the best-
governed state, all citizens will share, in turn, in ruling and being ruled. Thus, a single plan of education,
shared by all children, is appropriate.39 Not only should there be a single educational prograi but since the
39 See too l337a22-26, "And inasmich as the end for the whole state is one, it is lanifest that eduction 
also lust necessarily be one and the saie for all and that the superintendence of this lust be public, and on 
private lines, in the way in which at present each tan superintends the education of his own children, teaching 
thei privately, and whatever special branch of knowledge he thinks fit."
ÍA
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best couunities and the best individuals have the saie goals (i.e. teiperance, justice, courage, love of 
wisdoi), the lawgiver's work of establishing such schooling will have a couon, unified benefit for both the 
polis as a whole and its individual citizens. Indicating these educational purposes and the unification 
iiplicit in then, Aristotle returns to the nature-habit-reason scheie of developient to consider how each of 
these phases light be trained towards virtue and nous (I334bl6), stating that ”it is with a view to these ends 
that our engendering ftën oenesini and the training of our habits lust be regulated. " (1334bl6-18 ) The proper 
order of training, then, is first body, then appetite and then intellect (appetite and intellect corresponding, 
repectively, to the irrational and the rational parts of the soul) .
In keeping with his responsibility for the training of the body, the lawgiver supervises larriage 
unions, to assure that children with strong, well-balanced constitutions are born froi well-iatched parents of 
a suitable age who take proper physical care of theiselves. ( Μ  VII.14) Once children are bom, Aristotle 
reconends lilk and physical activity for then. Op to the age of five, play should be their priiary activity 
rather than intensive exercise or study. But even the play and story-telling of early childhood should be 
directed positively with the ultiiate goals in wind. Furthemore, since children see and hear so such and are 
so iipressionable, the lawgiver should regulate against indecent iiages and public talk, and those individuals 
violating these regulations should be punished - that is, the failure of virtue in the polis at large needs to 
be disciplined for the sake of children's proper fonation.
The child should be raised at hoie until the age of seven. At this age, however, the first of the two 
periods of publicly-supervised education begins (the first period runs froi age seven to puberty, i.e. age 
fourteen, and the second froi age fourteen to twenty-one). Education carried out privately by privately hired 
tutors is haphazard and not conducive to the unity of the polis.II337a2l-30V Aristotle weighs what subjects 
should be included in the prograi of the coaion, public schooling. He deteraines that soie studies should be 
provided to children because they are useful or necessary for working or living as an adult. Other studies 
should be provided just because they are liberal and noble and they prepare children for a free and noble 
Iife.(1338a40-b4) But before deliiiting these studies, Aristotle restates the principle that prior to the 
training in reason lust coie training of ethical habits, and prior to that nust cose training of the body. He 
resines bis talk of the details of the educational plan froi the beginning, that is, starting with gymastic 
training. Exercise is to be íoderate, building gradually in intensity; he warns against the execesses of the 
Spartans and their regiiins which produce an aniial-like nature in children. (1338b9-13) Hext he considers the 
inclusion of lusic. Clearly iiisic is pleasant, but the question froi the point of view of educating children 
is: does it affect the character and the soul? He concludes that lusic contains iiitations of character 
(1340a40), and that it has the "power of producing a certain effect on the íoral character of the soul" 
(1340bll-13), so that children lust be educated in it. In any case, he observes, lusic suits thei because it 
is pleasant and as children they find it is hardly possible to teach children anything unless it is sweetened 
with pleasure. Thus, the best educational prograi should include lusic. The discussion of children's education
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- and the M  as a whole - closes with Aristotle's sunary of the three principles that should guide education, 
and indeed have guided fron the start his own discussion of the child's fonation: Moderation, possibility and 
suitability.
The discussion of children in the Μ  VII and the linking of nature, habit and reason we have just 
exaiined confins our thesis that Aristotle has a conposite conception of the child and that it can be 
reconsituted by way of a linked exaiination of his analyses in the biology, ethics and politics. He have seen 
that the child has his or her beginnings prior to birth and grows froi unfinished to finished adulthood through 
linked phases. Each phase of developient has its own telos - the coiplete huían aniial nature at birth, the 
coiplete ethical character later on, and the cultured, educationally coiplete person ready for adult life in 
the polis - and so is differentiated. The teloi need to be laintained as separate and cannot be collapsed 
because different kinds of change are at issue, naiely substantial change in the biology and alteration in the 
ethics and politics. At the saie tiie, however, continuity is evident in several ways. Each phase is linked 
with the next as a prerequisite. Each phase laintains a coiion general fonula for the child as unfinished. 
In each phase the theie of liniiizing randoiness and laxiiizing order and intelligibility is evident. And each 
phase adopts a coiion explanatory scheie to provide for the order and intelligibility of the child's generation 
and developient, a scheie whereby a prior actuality or actualities provide the potentiality necessary for the 
appropriate change.
Are these cononalities enough to connect the distinct discussions and unify the· in a coiprehensive 
account of the child? It light be suggested, for exaiple, that the actuality/potentiality scheie is at work 
throughout Aristotle's philosophy and so is too generally applicable to establish the kind of continuity 
required here. Siiilarly, establishing preparatory or prerequisite connections along phases does not 
necessarily define adequately the relationship along the phases.40 A coiplete treatient of these questions 
would require an exaiination of Aristotle's discussion of and criteria for unity in the Hetar but that is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For the present, however, we light note a particular feature of Μ  VII and VIII 
suggestive of a iode of the child's unification.
In these books, Aristotle gives the lawgiver in the best of cities the authority to supervise larriage 
unions and to lake recoiiendations about the young child's up-bringing. The lawgiver's influence, in other 
words, is not restricted coipartientally to the child's public schooling in later life, but as we saw extends 
"back" to the child's very sources and then to the child's infancy in the oikos. Indeed, his influence is not 
only intensive throughout the child's lifespan but extensive as well, reaching broadly to the aspects of social
40 For exaiple, logic is a prerequisite for the study of letaphysics, but the full nature of the relation 
between these studies is not thereby revealed.
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life that need regulation due to their iipact on children . The lawgiver's actions, then, are directive of the 
good of the child prior to her or his very beginnings through to adulthood. The ultiiate ain is the healthy 
adult, ethically developed and educationally prepared for a life in the polis. And, it night be added, prepared 
to conence the next cycle: of begetting offspring, of raising then and training thei in good habits in the 
oikos. and participating in polis life in a way that carries on or cooperates with the good ains of the 
lawgiver, so that the continuity is expansive. Thus, the child's unification has its sources, for Aristotle, 
in a consciously directed good which oversees all the aspects of the child's generation and developient. The 
lawgiver, with his own cultivated asy§, also recognizes thé distinctions in the phases (i.e. nature, habit, 
reason) and the telos proper to each. The telos of each phase in the child's life is a good, but these goods 
are coiprehensively considered and directed through the lawgiver's intelligent and virtuous purpose: the well­
being of the child and the coipletion of the adult. In this respect, then, Aristotle naintains his division 
of the sciences and achieves a coherent and unified conception of the child.
